A tale of two lawsuits

Ellen Quinn vs. St. Louis County

By Jennifer Martin-Romme

Zenith City Weekly

St. Louis County has moved to dismiss the lawsuit brought against them on May 5 by Ellen Quinn, the former Public Information Officer now suing in connection with the 2007 sexual harassment complaint she raised against Commissioner Steve Rauker.

On August 13, the County asked Minnesota’s US District Court to dismiss Quinn’s complaint of defamation, emotional distress, breach of contract, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave and Human Rights Acts.

Quinn alleges that she and other women at the County were "subjected to various forms of bizarre treatment, conduct, and comments" from employees and elected officials, which continued even after Quinn says she complained to several parties, including then–County Attorney Alan Mitchell and then–Administrator Dana Frey.

Independent counsel has been hired to defend the County because Attorney Melanie Ford could be called as a witness. Quinn alleges that Ford was the object of "sexist remarks during open meetings…The Board did not trust that a woman could provide competent legal advice."

The petition alleges defamation in the form of public statements by Rauker, Mitchell, and Commissioner Mike Forsman. Quinn claims they continued to make defamatory remarks, even after Ford advised the Commissioners to stop commenting publicly on the matter.

Part of the County’s defense is that none of these individuals is personally named as a defendant — only the County as a "municipal corporation."

However, in their first response to the petition, the County claimed absolute immunity from defamation for statements made by "public officers…in the course of their duties."

Quinn responded that "there is no connection…between the flagrantly defamatory statements about Plaintiff being a liar…and the Commissioner’s function of conducting a meeting."

In their second response, the County claims that "Quinn was a County employee and any comment…made by County Commissioners about Quinn, especially her claims against the County, necessarily relates to their duties as elected officials."

Quinn’s complaint says, "[T]he comments were a breach of the Agreement between the parties and were retaliatory, creating a hostile work environment."

She claims symptoms of depression, anxiety, suicidality, and post–traumatic stress, for which she was allegedly denied medical leave, then "constructively discharged."

The exact nature of how Quinn’s employment ended remains a point of dispute, with the County arguing "she was unable to work on [her purported final day of employment] and is unable to work now…Moreover, job abandonment is a valid reason for termination."

However, in their first motion to dismiss, the County responded that Quinn’s employment was never terminated and that she has "failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

For example, the County argues that Quinn cannot claim disability discrimination, in part, because she "does not allege she ever requested an accommodation."

The County’s memo to support dismissal says, "Quinn agreed to report to the County Administrator 'or his successor.’ Now Quinn claims that she should have been allowed to disregard that provision as part of reasonable accommodation…The Americans with Disabilities Act does not require employers to provide a 'boss–ectomy’ as a reasonable accommodation."

The County also argues that the agreement, in which Quinn released her claims in exchange for six years’ employment, did not specifically include an agreement not to retaliate against her.

Quinn, who says she was forced to sign the agreement to keep her job, described this argument as "curious to say the least. In other words, Defendant states that since the Agreement did not specifically state that Defendant would not retaliate against Plaintiff, it could do so…to the point of incapacitating Plaintiff."

The County sought to dismiss Quinn’s claim of emotional distress on the basis that "she has not alleged facts rising to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct."

Quinn’s reply described the discrimination complaint as "prima facie" — self–evident, or evidence sufficient in itself to prove a fact:

Plaintiff tried to and did work with Mitchell but could not withstand his harassing, intimidating, and belittling treatment and within two months she requested a leave…To now permit Defendant to escape liability because it was successful in rendering Plaintiff incapable of working for it, would be an unjustifiable perversion of the law…reward[ing] an employer that drives an employee to physical or mental incapacity.